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It has been a little over a year since the Supreme Court, in Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,' decided that federal securities
claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act or
Exchange Act)2 are arbitrable.3 Since McMahon, there has been a
flurry of activity in, and focus upon, the general area of arbitration
of public securities disputes. This activity has generated particular
interest in such subjects as: arbitration forums; pre-trial procedures
and discovery; remedies and relief; composition of panels; training,
background and evaluation of arbitrators; and the rendering of written
opinions. In discussing many of these areas, this Article will track
the history of securities arbitration before McMahon, analyze the
McMahon decision, and explore possible solutions and alternatives
which may help forge the pattern of securities arbitration in the
future.
* Based upon comments delivered by Constantine N. Katsoris as a Panelist
at the program "Securities Arbitration 1988," sponsored by the New York Institute
of Finance on January 15, 1988, and an appearance before the Subcommittee (Markey
Committee) on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce on March 31, 1988.
** Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 1953, Fordham
University; J.D., 1957, Fordham University School of Law; LL.M., 1963, New York
University School of Law; Public Member of Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration (SICA) since its inception in 1977; Public Member of National Arbitration
Committee of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), 1975-1981;
Public Arbitrator at New York Stock Exchange since 1971; Public Arbitrator at
NASD since 1968; Arbitrator for First Judicial Department in New York since 1972.
1. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
2. Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)).
3. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2334.
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II. Securities Arbitration Before McMahon
A. Establishment of the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration (SICA)
Prior to 1976, most Securities Regulatory Organizations (SROs)
had differing rules for the administration of securities arbitration
disputes. In June 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC or Commission) solicited. comments from interested persons on
the feasibility of developing a "uniform system of dispute grievance
procedures for the adjudication of small claims." '4 After conducting
a public forum at which written and oral comments were received,
the SEC's Office of Consumer Affairs issued a report recommending
the adoption of procedures for handling investor disputes and the
creation of a new entity to administer the system.'
Before implementing the proposal for a new arbitration forum,
the Commission invited further public comment. 6 In response, several
SROs proposed that a securities industry task force be established
to consider the development of "a uniform arbitration code and the
means for establishing a more efficient, economic and appropriate
mechanism for resolving investor disputes involving small sums of
money." ' 7 Accordingly, a Securities Industry Conference on Arbitra-
tion (SICA), consisting of representatives of various SROs,8 the
Securities Industry Association (SIA) 9 and the public, 0 was established
4. Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 12528 (June 9, 1976), reprinted in 9 SEC Docket
833-35 (Mar.-July 1976).
5. Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 12974 (Nov. 15, 1976), reprinted in 10 SEC
Docket 955-56 (July-Dec. 1976).
6. See id.
7. Id. FiyTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION
2 (Apr. 1986) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office) [hereinafter FIFTH
REPORT].
8. The following SROs were represented: the American, Boston, Cincinnati,
Midwest, New York (NYSE), Pacific and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges, the Chicago
Board Options Exchange, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board and the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). Id. at 3.
9. Id. The SIA is a trade association for the securities industry.
10. Peter R. Celia, Jr., Esq., Mortimer Goodman, Esq., and the author have
served as Public Members of SICA since its creation in 1977. Id. In 1983, Justin
Klein, Esq., was added as the fourth Public Member of SICA. Id. The public
representatives were selected because of their broad experience, independence and
demonstrated interest in arbitration. Id. Peter Cella is principally a claimant's attorney
with wide litigation and corporate experience and was one of the people who testified
before the SEC regarding independent arbitration proceedings. Mortimer Goodman
is also an attorney with extensive experience in all aspects of the securities industry.
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in April 1977."
B. SICA's Role
Once SICA was created, the SEC initially requested that it address,
among other things, improved methods for the resolution of investors'
small claims.12 After holding numerous meetings throughout the coun-
try, SICA developed a simplified arbitration procedure for resolving
customer claims of $2,500 or less,1 3 and issued an informational
booklet describing small claims procedures (Small Claims Booklet). 4
Realizing, however, that the development of a small claims procedure
was only a first step," SICA then developed a comprehensive Uniform
Code of Arbitration (Uniform Code of Arbitration or Code) 6 for
the securities industry. The Code established a uniform system of
arbitration procedures for all claims by investors.' 7 In addition, SICA
prepared an explanatory booklet for prospective claimants (Procedures
Booklet or Arbitration Procedures) 8 explaining procedures under the
Justin Klein, who was subsequently added in 1983, was the Director of the Office
of Consumer Affairs when SICA was formed. The author was a public member
of the NASD's National Arbitration Committee (1975-1981) when SICA was initially
created. See also Statement of Constantine N. Katsoris before Markey Committee
(Mar. 31, 1988) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
11. FIrI REPORT, supra note 7, at 1-2.
12. Implementation of An Investor Dispute System, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,136, at 87,905 (Apr. 26, 1977) (Sec. Exch. Act
Release No. 13470) [hereinafter Investor Dispute System].
13. FirT REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. SICA subsequently raised the jurisdictional
limit of small claims to $5,000, and then again to the present $10,000. See SEC
Approves NASD Proposal to Raise Ceiling for Simplified Arbitrations, Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 560 (Apr. 15, 1988). Some SROs, however, have not
yet increased the small claims limit to $10,000.
14. See SEcURTEs INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, How TO PROCEED
wrrH THE ARBITRATION OF A SMALL CItM (undated) (available at Fordham Urban
Law Journal office).
15. REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE
SECUITIES AND EXCHANG E COMMISSION 7-8 (Nov. 15, 1977) (available at Fordham
Urban Law Journal office).
16. See Uniform Code of Arbitration (as amended), reprinted in FOURTH REPORT
OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMIssION Exhibit C (Nov. 1984) (available at Fordham Urban Law
Journal office) [hereinafter Uniform Code of Arbitration). The small claims procedure
was incorporated into § 2 of the Code. See Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra,
§ 2.
17. FIFTH REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
18. See TIHIRD REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION
TO THE SECURIms AND EXCHANGE COMMInsSION 5 (Jan. 31, 1980) (available at Fordham
Urban Law Journal office); SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION,
ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 11980) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office)
[hereinafter PROCEDURES BOOKLET].
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Code. To a great extent, the Code incorporated and harmonized the
rules of the various SROs and codified various procedures which the
SROs had followed but which were not included in their existing
rules. The Code was adopted by the participating SROs during 1979
and 1980.19 Since then, various revisions have been made to both
the Code and the Procedures Booklet, 20 and SICA has continued to
"meet periodically to monitor the performance of the Code in ac-
tion. '21 To date, well over ten thousand cases-including small claims-
have been filed with the participating SROs since the approval of
the Code. 22
C. Events Leading to McMahon
1. Wilko v. Swan
Most arbitration between an investor and his broker is brought
pursuant to an arbitration agreement executed at the time a customer
opens an account with his broker.23 Under the United States Arbi-
tration Act (Federal Arbitration Act or Arbitration Act), 24 agreements
to arbitrate future disputes are, in general, specifically enforceable. 25
19. FIFrH REPORT, supra note 7, at 4. Once SICA adopts a new rule, each SRO
must then generally go back to their organization in order to get a rule change
which is then usually submitted to the SEC for approval. Accordingly, there is often
a time lag between SICA approval and SRO action.
20. For examples of such amendments, see FIFTH REPORT, supra note 7, at 4-
5.
21. FWrH REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.
22. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 7, at Exhibit A-Statistical Report; Franklin,
Rewriting the Roles, Securities Arbitration: Claims Up; Procedures Proposed, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 28, 1988, at 5, col. 3.
23. SROs by rule require that their membership consent to arbitrate disputes
with their customers. By belonging to the SRO, its members agree to be bound by
the SRO's rules. Consequently, customers of an SRO may compel a member of an
SRO to arbitrate; however, absent a written contract, the member cannot compel
the customer to arbitrate. See P. HoBLiN, SEcuRrrms ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES,
STRATEGIES, CASES 2-3 to 2-4 (1988).
24. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
-25. Section 2 of the Arbitration Act provides: "A written provision in . . . a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration, a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." Id. § 2 (emphasis added). Because the Federal Arbitration
Act applies to claims arising from transactions involving interstate commerce, id.,
and because securities dealings usually involve such transactions, state securities
claims, as well as those arising under the federal securities laws, are usually arbitrable.
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In Wilko v. Swan, 26 however, the Supreme Court was faced with
the issue of whether a broker could bind a customer to arbitration
under such an agreement if the customer's claim arose under the
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act or Securities Act). 27
After recognizing that the essential purpose of the Arbitration Act
was to avoid the delay and expense of litigation, 2 whenever possible,
the Court observed that the purpose of the 1933 Act-with its three
special provisions-was to provide a judicial forum for the resolution
of securities disputes. 29
Faced with these two conflicting policies, the Court concluded that
although the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements might
be economically advantageous, 0 Congress' desire to protect investors
would be more effectively served by holding invalid any pre-dispute
arbitration agreements relating to issues arising under the 1933 Act.31
In effect, the Wilko Court concluded that the three special provisions
of the Securities Act-the non-waiver provision of section 14,32 in
conjunction with the special rights provision of section 1233 and the
special process and forum provisions of section 22 4-implicitly re-
pealed the Arbitration Act with regard to securities claims arising
under the 1933 Act.35
2. Problems Under the 1934 Act
Most federal securities claims brought against brokers by the public,
however, are brought under the 1934 Act. The reason for this is
26. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
27. 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)).
28. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
29. Id. The Court noted that the Securities Act was designed to protect investors
from fraud by requiring full disclosure on the part of the dealer. Id. In order to
effectuate this policy, Congress included three special provisions in the 1933 Act.
For example, § 12 specifically gave investors a special right to recover for misrep-
resentation which differs substantially from the common-law action in that this
special right imposes upon the seller the burden of proving lack of scienter. Id.;
48 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982)). Moreover, under
§ 14 of the Act, 48 Stat. 84 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982)), an investor could
not waive this special right. Finally, § 22 of the Act specifically affords the plaintiff
national service of process and a broad choice of forum by making the right
enforceable by the investor in any court of competent jurisdiction-federal or state.
48 Stat. 86 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982)).
30. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
31. Id. at 432.
32. 48 Stat. 84 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982)).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
35. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
19881
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVI
that, unlike the 1933 Act, which is concerned with the initial dis-
tribution of securities, 36 the 1934 Act deals principally with post-
distribution trading.37 Despite this difference, many federal courts
before McMahon presumed that the Wilko prohibition extended to
the 1934 Act, and thus refused to order arbitration-under pre-
dispute arbitration agreements-of customers' claims arising under
the Exchange Act. 8
The confusion regarding the Wilko extension to claims under the
1934 Act was further exacerbated when a public customer joined a
non-arbitrable Wilko claim with an arbitrable non-federal securities
claim. Some courts bifurcated the two and ordered that the Wilko
claim be litigated and the other claim be arbitrated.3 9 Other courts,
however, found the two claims to be so intertwined that it was
impractical or impossible to separate them and, therefore, ordered
that both be litigated together.4°
The intertwining/bifurcation issue was finally settled by the Supreme
Court in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,4l which involved both
1934 Act claims and arbitrable non-federal securities claims. Byrd
raised two issues: (1) whether Wilko extends to 1934 Act claims; and
(2) whether the federal and non-federal claims should be bifurcated
or, if intertwined, tried together. 42 Although the Court declined to
36. See Katsoris, Accountants' Third Party Liability-How Far Do We Go?,
36 FORDHAM L. REV. 191, 208-09 (1967) [hereinafter Katsoris I1. The Act requires
full and fair disclosure of the character of the securities sold to the public and
provides for civil liability. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o (1982).
37. See Katsoris I, supra note 36, at 209. Liability under the Exchange Act is
generally founded on § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1982), the implied provisions of
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), and the Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1985). Most 1934 Act investor claims against brokers,
however, involve § 10(b) of the Act. See Bell & Fitzgerald, Mixed Arbitrablel
Nonarbitrable Disputes, 16 REV. SEc. REG. 849, 851-52 (1983).
38. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir.
1979) (arbitration agreement overridden by anti-waiver provision of federal securities
laws); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-
29 (10th Cir. 1978) (same); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 1977) (same); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536 & n.12 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1010 (1976); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265,
268 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (same).
39. See Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 31 (E.D.
Cal. 1974) (arbitrable contract claim severed from a Rule lOb-5 claim).
40. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335 (5th Cir. 1981); Sibley
v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824
(1977).
41. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
42. Id. at 214, 215 n.1.
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specifically resolve the issue of whether Wilko applies to 1934 Act
claims,' 3 it did hold that when an arbitrable claim is joined with a
non-arbitrable Wilko claim, though intertwined, the claims need not
be tried together involuntarily. Thus, Byrd rejected the concept of
"intertwining" and supported the principle of automatic bifurcation,"
when a non-arbitrable Wilko claim is joined with an arbitrable claim.
In other words, the two claims may be tried separately and simul-
taneously. Whatever the merits of automatic bifurcation, it unleashes
and sets in motion two separate forums on a collision course. At
the very least, it greatly complicates the task of arbitrators, who
often are not lawyers. 45
III. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon
The issue of whether the Wilko exemption applied to 1934 Act
claims was answered by the Supreme Court in Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon.46 In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court reversed
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and ruled
that contractual agreements to arbitrate claims asserted under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act are enforceable and not exempted by Wilko. 47
Before McMahon, the SEC had adhered to the then generally
accepted position that 1934 Act claims could not be forced into
arbitration;" and, understandably, the SEC insisted that the public
be so notified. 49 The SEC changed its position, however, in McMahon
43. Id. at 215 n.l. The Court declined because Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
did not seek to compel arbitration of the federal securities claims at the district
court level. 1d.
44. See Pitt, 'Byrd', First Step to Heighten Role of Arbitration, Legal Times,
Mar. 11, 1985, at 15, col. 1.
45. See generally Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53
FoRDHAm L. REv. 279, 301-04 (1984) [hereinafter Katsoris II].
46. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
47. 107 S. Ct. at 2341-42. It is noteworthy that McMahon did not overrule
Wilko as to 1933 Act claims. Indeed, the Wilko application to 1933 Act claims
was recently upheld in McCowan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 87 Civ. 2336
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1987). See also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987);
but see Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Brothers Inc., No. 87-2888 (5th
Cir. May 31, 1988); Karouras v. Visual Products Systems, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 205
(W.D. Pa. 1988); Staidman v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 673
F. Supp. 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1987). Regardless of whether the Supreme Court ultimately
overrules Wilko, the fact remains the special provisions sought to be protected by
the 1933 Act differ from the 1934 Act. See Katsoris II, supra note 45, at 297-
301.
48. See Katsoris II, supra note 45, at 296-97.
49. See Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 19813 (May 26, 1983), reprinted in 27 SEC
Docket 1260 (Feb.-June 1983).
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and, stressing its "oversight" role over SROs, asserted that 1934 Act
claims should be arbitrable. In resolving the issue, the Supreme Court
noted:
This mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko
opinion in 1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of
arbitration that has prevailed since that time. This is especially so
in light of the intervening changes in the regulatory structure of
the securities laws. Even if Wilko's assumptions regarding arbi-
tration were valid at the time Wilko was decided, most certainly
they do not hold true today for arbitration procedure subject to
the SEC's oversight authority. 0
The McMahon Court, in a 9 to 0 decision, also ruled that contractual
agreements to arbitrate claims asserted under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)5 are similarly enforceable.52
IV. Events After McMahon
The practical effect of McMahon is that securities arbitrations will
multiply, because it effectively sealed the escape valve of a separate
10(b) 1934 Act hearing in federal court.53 With arbitration now
50. 107 S. Ct. at 2341.
51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-64 (1982).
52. 107 S. Ct. at 2343-44. Yet, the SEC does not have the power to administer
the law under RICO. Interestingly, this unanimous opinion on RICO was joined
by Justice Blackmun, who filed a dissent (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall)
to the Court's opinion on § 10(b), suggesting that procedures at the various SROs
might be inadequate to resolve federal securities disputes or biased towards the
securities industry. In spite of this "the dissenting Justices on the § 10(b) issue
joined the majority in agreeing that RICO disputes are arbitrable notwithstanding
the fact that RICO claims predicated on federal securities law violations will now
be resolved at the very forums which they have attacked." Krebsbach & Friedman,
Securities Arbitration 1988, at 3 (Jan. 15, 1988) (unpublished manuscript) (available
at Fordham Urban Law Journal office). Moreover, because RICO claims often
may involve the same pattern of conduct, complicated issues of joinder and con-
solidation could surface. See generally Abrams, Civil Rico's Cause of Action: The
Landscape After Sedima, 12 TULANE MARTUME L.J. 19, 41-51 (1988). Section 13(c)
of the Uniform Code of Arbitration places such authority to join and consolidate
claims initially on the Director of Arbitration and finally upon the discretion of
the arbitration panel. See FErH REPORT, supra note 7, at 34. Unfortunately, this
issue of joinder and consolidation raises a difficult dilemma of whether the possibility
of substantial prejudice arising from such consolidation or joinder outweighs the
"time and expense involved in separate actions or the possibility of conflicting
awards." Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for
Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REv. 473, 489-90 (1987).
53. See Arbitration Caseloads Expected to Rise in Wake of Market Crash,
Alternative Dispute Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 278-79 (Nov. 12, 1987); Salwer, Investors
Swamp Securities-Arbitration System, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1988, at 37, col. 3.
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realistically the principal forum for the settlement of securities dis-
putes, a reexamination of its strengths and its weaknesses is warranted.
The issues are numerous and the debate is healthy.
Shortly after the McMahon decision, the SEC dispatched to SICA
a list of recommendations for changes in SRO arbitration, and
requested SICA's comments.14 SICA responded in a letter which
represented a consensus view of its members." Several members of
SICA also sent separate responses, in addition to the official SICA
response.16 Many of these issues had already been previously discussed
at SICA; and, SICA's response was generally in agreement with the
SEC's proposals.17 There is still some honest disagreement on certain
points, and constructive ongoing discussions between SICA and the
SEC are continuing. This Article will not comment specifically on
such ongoing discussions. Instead, in an attempt to make the ar-
bitration process fairer, yet preserve it as a viable and attractive
alternative remedy to court litigation, this Article will focus on and
attempt to analyze some of the more common suggestions and crit-
icisms regarding present securities arbitration procedures 8
After the McMahon case, some have suggested that Congress
overturn that ruling and decree that pre-dispute arbitration agreements
54. See Letter from SEC to SICA (Sept. 10, 1987), [hereinafter SEC Letter],
reprinted in J. SCHROPP, SECURITIES ARBITRATION, NEW APPROACHES TO SECURITIES
COUNSELLING & LITIGATION AFTER MCMAHON 141-53 (1988) [hereinafter SCHROPP].
The SEC's proposals principally revolved around such issues as: selection, quali-
fication, background training and evaluation of arbitrators; challenges for cause;
method of transcribing and preserving the record of arbitration hearings; written
outline and explanation of the basis for an award; pre-hearing discovery, depositions
and exchange of documents; expanding the use of educational pamphlets; increased
pressure on SRO arbitration systems brought about by the anticipated increased
case load; adherence to Rule 19b-4; notification of abuses to disciplinary authorities;
and large cases. Id.
55. See SICA Letter to Richard G. Ketchum (Dec. 14, 1987) [hereinafter SICA
Letter], reprinted in ScHRoPP, supra note 54, at 154-69. It is noteworthy, however,
that the composition of SICA is: ten SROs, the SIA and four public members.
Obviously, the public members are in the minority, which means they cannot effect
change unilaterally or as fast as they wish. Nevertheless-even before the intense
scrutiny of arbitration brought on by McMahon-a productive and generally co-
operative spirit has prevailed at SICA which has led to greater uniformity and
steady progress and improvement over the years.
56. See, e.g., Letter from Public Members of SICA to Richard G. Ketchum
(Oct. 9, 1987) [hereinafter Public Members' Letter], reprinted in SCHROPP, supra
note 54, at 170-72.
57. See SICA Letter, supra note 55, at 155.
58. The opinions expressed herein are the author's and do not necessarily
represent those of SICA.
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are not binding as to 1934 Act claims.5 9 In fact, Congress has begun
examining arbitration in the aftermath of McMahon.60 Whatever the
outcome of such inquiry, it is respectfully suggested that Congress
should not overrule McMahon because of court congestion and the
Supreme Court's decision in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.6 1
The Byrd Court held that when an arbitrable claim is joined with
a non-arbitrable federal securities claim, it would not order the claims
to be involuntarily tried together, even though they were intertwined.6 2
In other words the two claims-even though factually related-could
be tried separately and simultaneously. 63 Troublesome logistical and
practical issues could result from having two discovery proceedings
and hearings occurring at the same time at different locations before
different triers of fact. Moreover, complicated issues of collateral
estoppel and res judicata are sure to surface-raising a difficult
question as to the preclusive effect, if any, that a decision at one
forum would have upon the other forum, and vice versa 4 Our
congested trial dockets should not be subjected to such unnecessary
duplication and confusing trauma.
V. To What Extent Do We Change Securities Arbitration?
What is attractive about arbitration is that it is generally speedy,
economical and fair. Obviously, improvements can always be made;
but, we should retain the basic characteristics of arbitration.
The dangers in the post-McMahon era are efforts to recast ar-
bitration as a clone to court litigation. If that occurs, then why do
59. See, e.g., McMahon Decision Should Be Overturned To Protect Investors,
House Panel Told, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 492 (Mar. 31, 1988)
[hereinafter Protect Investors].
60. Nash, The House of Representatives, Life in a Giant Shadow Tests Law-
makers' Skills, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1988, at A20, col. 1 [hereinafter Nash].
61. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
62. Id. at 217. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987).
64. See Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J
3, 9-11 (1986) [hereinafter Katsoris III]. Indeed, the author recently sat as an
arbitrator in a case where the bifurcated federal claim had already been dismissed
in federal court; and, thereafter the claimant sought to proceed with the arbitrable
claim. In ruling on whether such federal disposition of the federal securities claim
precludes the later arbitration, it required-at the very least-a careful reading and
analysis of the federal securities proceedings. Such needless layers of delay and
confusion should be avoided at all cost. Thus, assuming arguendo that Congress
overturns McMahon, Congress should then also overturn the automatic bifurcation
provisions of Byrd and allow intertwined claims to be tried together. See supra
notes 39-45 and accompanying text. That, at least, would avoid duplicative litigation.
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we need a separate duplicative system that parallels our court system?
Why not just expand our court system? Simply put, the lengthy
litigation, excessive costs and delay prevalent in our court system is
hardly the answer either for the securities industry or the public it
serves. Recently, in California, the Los Angeles County Bar Asso-
ciation filed suit in federal court to appoint more state court judges
because it takes about five years for a civil case to come to trial.65
This is simply unacceptable. 66 Indeed, justice delayed, or made pro-
hibitively costly, often results in justice denied.
Although speed and economy are important, they should not be
achieved at the expense of fairness. All three can co-exist, however,
with fairness the paramount consideration. Thus, in opting for ar-
bitration, we must provide the necessary safeguards to ensure a fair
and complete hearing without-in the process-destroying the fabric
of arbitration. Because such safeguards often slow the proceedings
down, the benefits of each new procedure must be weighed against
the resultant escalation in time and cost. This Article will now consider
some of the current suggestions of change.
A. Pre-Hearing Procedures
Generally, pre-trial discovery procedures such as bills of particulars,
interrogatories, depositions and notices to produce documents are
intended to eliminate "trial by ambush . . . by bfinging to light the
pertinent [issues] before trial.' '67 Unfortunately, such discovery can
be unnecessarily expensive and burdensome.6 Indeed, it can "become
a stalling tactic, a nuisance, an effort to grind down the other side." ' 69
It is largely for these reasons that in most jurisdictions pre-trial
discovery is much more limited in arbitration than in an action at
65. See Marcotte, L.A. County Bar Sues California, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1988,
at 28; see also Lawsuits Triple in Federal Courts, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1987, at
B6, col. 6.
66. Current estimates indicate that claims at the New York Stock Exchange
take about 9 months. See Morris, Was He Hibernating With Puxatawney Phil?,
Nat'l L.J., Apr. 11, 1988, at 12, col. 2.
67. Goldstein, Issue of Pretrial Discovery, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1979, at D4,
col. 1 [hereinafter Goldstein].
68. COMMITTEE ON ARBITRATION, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., THE
USE oF DISCOVERY iN ARBITRATION 231-32 (1978) [hereinafter THE USE OF DISCOVERY
IN ARBITRATION].
69. Goldstein, supra note 67, at D4, col. 1. See also Oberer, Trial By Ambush
Or Avalanche? The Discovery Debacle, 1987 Mo. J. OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1, 5;
Hazard, Depositions: Modern-Day Inquisitions, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 14, 1988, at 13,
col. 1.
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law. 70 It is principally for this reason that arbitration is cheaper and
speedier than court litigation; and, it is precisely this desire to contain
costs and avoid delay that is usually the major reason why parties
elect and agree to arbitrate disputes. 71
In securities arbitration, the parties are expected to exchange doc-
uments informally "as will serve to expedite the arbitration. ' 72 There
is, however, no established mechanism to ensure that parties cooperate
in document production. Accordingly, some parties do not produce
documents until the day of the hearing. The practical problem under
the Uniform Code is that the party seeking the documents "does
not know whether on the day of the hearing, he is going to argue
over discovery matters only or whether the arbitrators will proceed
to resolve the case on the merits." '73
Arbitrators, under their broad powers, already have the authority
to resoNe discovery disputes in advance of the hearing. Indeed, some
SROs forward discovery disputes to arbitrators, prior to hearings on
the merits, 74 including giving the panel chairman the authority to be
sworn and to resolve discovery disputes in advance of the hearing.
Some arbitrators, however, particularly those who are not attorneys,
are reluctant to exercise such powers without specific authorization
in the Uniform Code.
In any event, it would appear that the time has arrived to codify
the informal practice of some SROs to get the arbitrators involved
in discovery disputes before the first hearing. 7" Even if this involves
some additional cost and time, it would appear to be more than
counterbalanced by the equitable consideration of preventing undue
surprise and possible prejudice to either party once the hearing on
the merits begins. In fact, the resolution of such disputes before the
first hearing might often save time and expense at the hearing.
What would prevent such procedures from becoming abusive as
often happens in court litigation? The answer is, an experienced
70. See Katsoris II, supra note 45, at 287 n.52 (citations omitted).
71. See Tnm USE OF DISCOVERY IN ARBITRATION, supra note 68, at 232.
72. See Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 16, § 20(b). "Prior to the
first hearing session, the parties shall cooperate in the voluntary exchange of such
documents and information as will serve to expedite the arbitration. If the parties
agree, they may also submit additional documents to the Director of Arbitration
for forwarding to the arbitrators." FmrH REPORT, supra note 7, at 35.
73. SEC Letter, supra note 54, at 149.
74. This author has, as an arbitrator, been involved in such pre-hearing discovery
disputes and feels these procedures work quite well.
75. See SEC Letter, supra note 54, at 149-50. It is noteworthy, however, that
the public members of SICA had proposed such pre-hearing rules long before the
McMahon decision. See Public Members' Letter, supra note 56, at 170.
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knowledgeable arbitrator who will not let matters get out of hand.
Accordingly, SICA is in the process of amending the Uniform Code
of Arbitration by basically providing that if a demand for documents
is not honored within a certain period of time or is objected to
within that same period of time, the requesting party can have an
arbitrator appointed who will then oversee and enforce the discovery
process before the first hearing.7 6 Moreover, SICA is also in the
process of amending its Uniform Code of Arbitration to provide for
pre-hearing discovery conferences.17
. The Code does not specifically refer to depositions. SICA is pres-
ently considering adopting such a rule in limited circumstances .7 This
rule will be based upon the existing authority of parties to take
depositions under statutory and case law in limited circumstances. 79
In this regard, it should be noted that an SRO rule mandating certain
forms of depositions could only reach unavailable witnesses who are
members or persons associated with members. 0 Of course, enforce-
ability by a court of a deposition is coextensive with the law applicable
to that court without regard to an SRO rule.8"
B. Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreement
1. Voluntariness
Another persistent complaint is that the public investor is often
forced by the broker to execute a pre-dispute arbitration agreement
at the time of opening a securities account. 2 Although some courts
76. See SROs May Propose Rule To Facilitate Pre-Hearing Discovery in Ar-
bitrations, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 411 (Mar. 18, 1988). Actually,
SICA had already adopted such a rule in March 1988; the rule is in the process
of some adjustment, because of some SRO objections. See Arbitration Group To
Urge SRO Review of Disclosures in Customer Agreements, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 20, at 559 (Apr. 15, 1988). An amended discovery rule was finally
adopted by SICA at its meeting of May 24, 1987. See SROs Nearing Agreement
on Using Summary Arbitration Award, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at
795 (May 27, 1988). The rule provides that once a party has requested a document
the other side has 30 days in which to produce the document or file an objection,
with any disputes being ultimately resolved by a single arbitrator, or the entire
panel, as the case may be. Id.
77. Id.




82. See Katsoris II, supra note 45, at 292 n.86.
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have recognized the issue of adhesion, 3 it would appear that most
courts do not consider it to be a problem in the case of securities
arbitration clauses.14 Regardless of current trends, however, the issue
should be examined as part of the public's overall perception as to
the fairness of the arbitration process. 5
Investors should not be forced to agree to a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement as a condition to access to the securities markets. It should
be entered into freely, and only after the full effect and meaning
of such a clause is disclosed. 6 Besides, such informed consent would
83. See Graham .v. Scissor-Tail Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 604 (1981); Hope v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 122 Cal. App.
3d 147, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1981). Adhesion arises when a standardized contract,
usually drafted by a party of superior bargaining power, is presented to a party
whose choice is limited to accepting or rejecting the contract without the opportunity
to negotiate its terms. Such agreements are usually used when a party enters into
similar transactions with many individuals, and the agreements resemble ultimatums
or laws rather than mutually negotiated contracts. See Katsoris II, supra note 45,
at 306. As to the enforceability of such contracts generally, see id. at 306-09.
84. See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke Inc., No. 87-6174 (9th Cir.
Mar. 2, 1988); Parr v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 139 Cal. App. 3d
440, 446-47, 188 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805 (1983). It would also appear that in McMahon,
the Supreme Court did not consider that the contract to arbitrate was one of
adhesion. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 Sup. Ct. 2232,
2336 (1987).
85. SICA has never specifically addressed the issue of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in depth because many of the SRO members believed that such agree-
ments were private contractual issues between the customer and the broker. Nev-
ertheless, this author has repeatedly expressed concern about the voluntariness of
the arbitration agreement before McMahon. See Katsoris II, supra note 45, at 306-
09; Katsoris III, supra note 64, at 11-14. See also T. Ricks, SEC May Seek Ban
on Clauses for Arbitration, Wall St. J., June 2, 1988, at 26, col. 5.
86. See Katsoris II, supra note 45, at 296 n.124. Indeed, a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7-26 (1982), is en-
forceable if:
a. executing the agreement is not essential to access to the market;
b. customer . . . separately signs the arbitration clause or agreement;
and,
c. customer is given a warning, in bold face type, that he is surrendering
certain rights to assert his claim in court.
17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b)(1), (2), (6) (1988). In fact, such agreement may not require
the customer to waive the right to seek reparations under § 14 of the Commodity
Exchange Act and Part 12 of the regulations; and, such customer has 45 days to
seek such reparations after being notified that arbitration will be demanded under
the agreement. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b)(3) (1988). Considering the fact that the industry
is generally automatically bound to arbitrate, see supra note 23 and accompanying
text, a pre-dispute securities arbitration agreement-if freely and knowledgeably
consented to-should thereafter be binding without an additional escape clause such
as the 45 day option applicable to commodities futures trading. Id. To hold otherwise
would make a mockery of the law of contracts.
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eliminate the troublesome issue, that often arises, of whether a
customer understood or even read the arbitration clause.
Some in the industry have countered that such clauses are necessary
because of the great cost differential between court litigation and
arbitration; and, if a customer refuses to so sign, he should be
required to pay for the additional cost differential through increased
commissions (a two-tiered rate structure)Y
The two-tiered rate structure, however, raises an interesting ques-
tion. It presumes that an unwilling customer can find access to the
market through a broker who would accept his account. Assuming
such access is assured, there may be some justification for the
imposition of a reasonable surcharge to cover the additional court
litigation costs. If such access is not available to the public customer,
however, then some remedial action would appear to be in order."8
2. Standard Agreement
Quite apart from the voluntariness of executing a pre-dispute ar-
bitration clause is the issue of the contents of such clauses.
Arbitration clauses should be entered into freely and their meaning
expressed in plain open language. Recent incidents, however, point
to the necessity of requiring some sort of basic safeguards or stan-
dardization.
For example, SICA has a six-year rule for the bringing of actions
in arbitration.A9 A broker recently inserted a one-year statute of
limitations clause in an arbitration clause.90 Such a unilateral disregard
87. See Protect Investors, supra note 59, at 492-93.
88. Although that may not now be the case, particularly with respect to cash
accounts, it is possible that through conscious parallelism in action such access
may be denied someday. In that event, Congress should insist upon access without
a pre-dispute arbitration clause, without prohibiting a reasonable surcharge for
handling an account without the arbitration clause. Permitting the imposition of
such a surcharge does not seem unreasonable in view of the fact that brokers'
commissions and margin interest rates are already negotiable. On the other hand,
if this litigation surcharge becomes excessive, Congress should entertain the im-
position of a reasonable cap based upon cost differentials. It remains to be seen,
however, whether competitive forces in the market would permit the imposition of
such a two-tiered rate structure.
89. See Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 16, § 4.
90. See Roney & Co. v. Goren, 88 Civ. 72105DT (E.D. Mich. 1988). Moreover,
it is worthy of note that the Third Circuit-in borrowing from the provisions of
the 1934 Act-recently held that the proper limitations period for claims arising
under § 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 is one year after the plaintiff discovers the facts
constituting the violation, and in no event, more than three years after such violation.
See In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, Nos. 87-5205/5385 (3d Cir.
Mar. 8, 1988).
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for the Uniform Code of Arbitration at the expense of an unsuspecting
customer who "willingly" signed the agreement runs counter to the
perception that the arbitration process is fair. Moreover, arbitration
clauses often will use language that the law of a particular state will
apply, such as New York. Although the clause seems innocent enough,
it obscures the fact that New York law does not permit punitive
damages in arbitration. 9' In short, the arbitration clause should not
become a trap for the unwary. 92
C. The Arbitration Panels
1. Classification of Arbitrators
The rules of arbitration and the forums that administer them must
be fair and impartial to both sides; however, both are only as good
as the arbitrators that serve. Moreover, it is axiomatic that those
arbitrators must be, and appear to be, honest, competent and free
of any conflict of interest.
The SICA Procedures Booklet provides that arbitrators aie to be
impartial persons who are knowledgeable in the areas in controversy. 93
Each sponsoring organization maintains a roster of individuals who
are not employees of the sponsoring organization but whose pro-
fessional qualifications and experience qualify them for service as
arbitrators. 94 As a safeguard to public customers, the Uniform Code
of Arbitration clearly provides that unless the public customer requests
otherwise, the matter will be arbitrated by a panel "at least a majority
of whom shall not be from the securities industry" (public arbi-
91. See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d
831 (1976). Whether the holding in Garrity remains valid today may be questioned
in light of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982), and the Supreme
Court's strong support for arbitration. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). See also Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., No. 87-3270 (11th Cir. Jan. 22, 1988). In any event, arbitration and court
litigation should basically differ on procedural matters only, but not necessarily
on the scope of relief granted. See Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration:
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 65 B.U.L. REv. 953 (1986).
92. See PROCEDURES BOOKLET, supra note 18, at 3. Some sort of mutually
agreeable standard arbitration clause should be achievable through the efforts of
the SEC or the SROs. See also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
93. See PROCEDURES BOOKLET, supra note 18, at 3.
94. Id.
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trators).95 No further guidance, however, is given by the Code as to
who qualifies to be a public arbitrator. Furthermore, only a slight
clarification was provided by the original version of the Procedures
Booklet, which described public arbitrators as "individuals who are
neither associated with, nor employed by a broker-dealer or securities
industry organization." 96
The Code and Procedures Booklet left several questions unan-
swered. For example, does the fact that someone was once associated
with the securities industry disqualify him as a public arbitrator?
Similar questions arose concerning the person who owns publicly
traded stock of a brokerage house or who services clients in the
securities industry, such as an attorney or a public accountant. Finally,
would SICA disqualify an employee of a corporation that is not in
the securities business but that is either a parent or subsidiary of a
brokerage house? After much debate, SICA revised the Procedures
Booklet by adding the following classification section:
Guidelines for the Classification of Persons as Public Arbitrators:
No one may serve as a public arbitrator who has been an
employee or partner of a member organization or subsidiary thereof,
or a shareholder of a non-publicly owned member organization
or subsidiary thereof for a period of three years immediately
preceding his or her appointment as a public arbitrator.
Additional information concerning a particular arbitrator may
be obtained by a party or the party's attorney upon request directed
to the Director of Arbitration prior to the commencement of the
hearing or a submission to the arbitrator without a hearing. 97
SICA purposely left the section governing classification of public
arbitrators flexible so that the vast experience of many needed and
qualified persons would not be lost. Nevertheless, the SEC has sug-
95. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 16, § 8(a)(1), (2). It has recently
been suggested that arbitration panels should consist only of public members. See
SIA, NASAA Split Over Fairness of Securities Arbitration Procedures, Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 870 (June 10, 1988). Gluck, Seeking 'Fairness' in
Brokers' Disputes, N.Y. Daily News, June 26, 1988, (Business), at 10, col. 1. Not
only would this suggestion purge such panels of invaluable insight into the workings
of the securities industry, but it would undoubtedly be perceived by that industry
as stacking the deck against it. Indeed, if the industry loses faith in the feasibility
of arbitration and succeeds in avoiding its use, it is suggested that the public will
generally not be well served. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
96. PROCEDURES BOOKLET, supra note 18, at 3. T 'e search for a "Diogenes"
type of trier is hardly limited to arbitration. See Petzinger, Celebrities of Texaco's
Saga, Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1988, at 6, col. 1; Wachtler Supports A Nonpartisan
Vote To Re-elect Judges,'N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1988, at 56, col. 1.
97. See FIRTH REPORT, supra note 7, at 17.
19881
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XVI
gested a tighter definition of public arbitrator, with a view towards
eliminating from that classification those with close affiliations with
the securities industry. This dialogue with SICA is presently contin-
uing. The New York Stock Exchange has already tightened its guide-
lines unilaterally;9 and, it is suggested that they be adopted by all
the SROs.
2. Information on Arbitrators
Moreover, section 11 of the Code requires arbitrators to disclose
circumstances which might preclude them from rendering an objective
and impartial determination. In addition, the Procedures Booklet
provides that "[a]dditional information concerning a particular ar-
bitrator may be obtained by a party or the party's attorney upon
request directed to the Director of Arbitration prior to the com-
mencement of the hearing or a submission to the arbitrator without
98. The latest New York Stock Exchange guidelines for arbitration provide:
In order to insure continued investor confidence in the arbitration process,
the New York Stock Exchange has adopted the following policies with
regard to the classification of securities industry and public arbitators
and to the exercise of challenges for cause:
1. Individuals with close securities industry ties such as attorneys, ac-
countants or other professionals who routinely represent industry firms
or individuals, will either be reclassified as industry arbitrators or not
be used.
2. Individuals who have spent a substantial part of their business careers
in the securities industry shall always be classified as industry arbitrators.
3. Individuals who have spent a relatively minor portion of their career
in the securities industry shall not be classified as public arbitrators until
at least five (5) years have elapsed from the date of their last industry
affiliation. All such past affiliations shall be disclosed and challenges for
cause based upon such past affiliations shall be sustained.
4. Close family relationships with broker/dealers shall be disclosed and
challenges for cause based on such relationships shall be honored.
5. Attorneys, accountants and other professionals whose firms have close
securities industry ties will still be classified as public arbitrators provided
the attorney or other professional does not routinely represent industry
firms or individuals. Challenges for cause based on such industry ties
will be honored.
6. All arbitrators shall read and become familiar with the Code of Ethics
for Arbitrators developed by the American Bar Association and the
American Arbitration Association.
7. Any close question on arbitrator classification or on challenges for
cause shall be decided in favor of public customers.
8. Spouses of securities industry personnel may not serve as arbitrators.
See ScmHopp, supra note 54, at 108; see also Exchanges, SEC Staff Still Split Over
Definition of 'Public' Arbitrator, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 100 (Jan.
22, 1988).
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a hearing." 99 Nevertheless, the SEC has recommended that SICA be
more specific as to the scope of such disclosure.l°° Accordingly, SICA
is considering amending the Code to require detailed biographical
information from each arbitrator, most of which will be available
automatically to the parties when the arbitrators are appointed. 01
This approach will help detect potential conflicts-of-interest initially,
and aid in the participants' exercise of their peremptory challenges
and those for cause. 102
3. Training of Arbitrators
Before the McMahon decision, the typical securities arbitration
claim involved churning, unauthorized trading or unsuitability. After
McMahon, arbitrators will more likely also be expected to handle
10(b) claims'013 and treble damage claims under RICO, 1°4 and rule on
issues of discovery, document exchange, 05 and motions to preclude
arbitration because of res judicata or collateral estoppel.1° It is
imperative, therefore, that arbitrators receive more extensive training.
SICA feels, however, that educational training for arbitrators through
seminars and periodic newsletters is generally better handled through
the various SROs, and SICA encourages them to do so. 107 Never-
theless, SICA has undertaken to develop an arbitrators' manual to
instruct arbitrators concerning their duties and responsibilties. 08
4. Evaluation of Arbitrators
There have been suggestions that arbitrators be evaluated on their
performance.' 9 Such evaluations have been done informally by SRO
arbitration staffs for years. No one can question the usefulness of
an evaluation process in retaining competent arbitrators, or in purging
incompetent ones. On the other hand, it should be done in a dignified
and professional manner by the arbitration staffs or the other ar-
99. PROCEDURES BOOKLET, supra note 18, at 3.
100. See ScHRopp, supra note 54, at 145.
101. See id. at 158.
102. See id. at 159.
103. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
107. See SCHROPP, supra note 54, at 157.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 145.
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bitrators. It should not turn into a popularity contest by parties,
either jubilant or disgruntled by an award."10
In a similar vein, it has been suggested that a public voting record
be kept on each arbitrator, i.e., the type of case, the issues involved,
the ruling and the dollar amount of the award. Presumably, the
purpose of this is to assist the public in exercising challenges because
laymen, or their counsel, are not as familiar with the habits of
arbitrators as are the "in-house" staff of the industry who appear
regularly before the arbitrators. Although this suggestion has some
merit, it also has its drawbacks, for it can lead to a misleading
impression, depending on the relative merits of each claim.", More-
over, the results may often be obscured by the process of consensus
that often takes place in awards. Furthermore, to consciously identify
an arbitrator as pro-public or pro-industry does a disservice to the
ideal that all arbitrators, public or private, are neutral and decide
only on the oral and written evidence. Finally, it is a disquieting
thought that arbitrators-mindful that they have ruled one way or
the other because of correct and valid reasons-would even consider,
consciously or unconsciously, their prior rulings in deciding on the
next close case in order to protect their "record resume."
In the final analysis the only true test of an arbitrator's mettle is
to check the "record" of each proceeding he or she sat on, and
not merely the final score. Admittedly, such a process is much more
time consuming, but it is fairer and gives a truer reading.
5. Consideration for the Arbitrator
With the anticipated increase in numbers and complexities of
arbitrations" 2"-at a time when the classification of public arbitrators
is narrowing" 3-the need for recruiting additional competent arbi-
trators is compelling."1 Similarly, attention should be given to re-
taining good arbitrators." 5
110. See id. at 171.
111. If one arbitrator saw ten consecutive cases where there was clearly no valid
claim, and another saw ten consecutive cases where there clearly was a claim, what
would one expect their respective "paper" records to be? Would any respectablejurist want to be rated in this manner? See, e.g., In Memoriam: Judge Edward
Weinfeld Uniquely Served Both the Law and His Law School, New York University
School of Law Alumni Newsletter 1 (Spring 1988).
112. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
114. See D. Lipton, Discovery Proceedings and the Selection and Training of
Arbitrators: A Study of Securities Industry Practices 17-21 (undated) (unpublished.




Thus, in weighing many of the suggestions mentioned above re-
garding arbitration, the benefits should not only be weighed against
any resultant additional cost and delay, but consideration should be
given as to whether it discourages intelligent, honest and knowl-
edgeable arbitrators from serving. In this regard, wasting their val-
uable time as a result of repeated adjournments is a frequent complaint;
and, in this regard everyone bears some responsibility.
When a panel is appointed, arbitrators block out hearing dates on
their calendars to the exclusion of other events. Accordingly, it is
not fair to them to cancel these dates later for little or no reason.
Because of this, judges dealing with attorneys appearing before them-
but who have prior commitments elsewhere in securities arbitration
hearings-must honor such prior arbitration commitments with the
same degree of respect and concern as they would in dealing with
attorneys with prior commitments before other judicial tribunals. In
other words, arbitration hearings cannot be treated as second-class
citizens to court proceedings. It is not fair to the parties, and it is
not fair to the arbitrators.
Similarly, attorneys should not think of arbitration as a place where
they can come and get an adjournment of hearings for little or no
reason. It is difficult enough to stock the system with competent
arbitrators without their having to lose two or three dates because
of meaningless adjournments. You could not do it in court, and you
should not be allowed to do it in arbitration. The issue of repeated
adjournments is of great concern to SICA. 116
Furthermore, the Uniform Code of Arbitration provides that unless
requested by the arbitrators or a party or parties to a dispute, no
record of the arbitration procedure need be kept." 7 Certain SROs,
however, have already provided for the preservation of a record of
the proceeding." 8 SICA has already proposed an amendment to the
Code that would require that a record be kept in all proceedings." ' 9
In any event, such a record should also be transcribed for the benefit
of the arbitrators in a multi-session or complex arbitration which
spans an extended period of time.' 20
116. The Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 16, requires that "a party
requesting an adjournment after arbitrators have been appointed, if said adjournment
is granted, shall pay a fee equal to the deposit of costs but not more than $100."
Id. § 18(b). Perhaps the time has come to increase this fine, at least after the first
adjournment.
117. See Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 16, § 25.
118. See SCHROPP, supra note 54, at 159.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 171 ("[i]t is unrealistic to expect that the details and minutiae
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D. Written Opinions
Still another topic recently discussed at SICA is whether to require
arbitrators to render mandatory written opinions with findings of
fact and conclusions of law.12' There are obvious advantages to such
a suggestion, in that: (1) it gives insight into the reasons for the
award; and (2) it may also help the claimants' bar in familiarizing
itself with the views of the various arbitrators in exercising peremptory
challenges. 22 Upon closer analysis, however, such benefits may be
outweighed by the negative implications of requiring such opinions.
First of all, such opinions would not necessarily be binding on,
or of any precedential value to, other arbitration panels. They would
often be written by laymen 23 inexperienced in expressing themselves
in legal terms. The opinions would have to deal with claims that
are often vague, loosely put together, and not always clearly set
forth. Requiring such opinions might discourage many fine arbitrators,
who are usually busy, successful people who basically serve at nominal
cost, from serving.
Requiring written opinions would certainly slow down the rendering
of awards; for, awards are often the basis of consensus. For example,
suppose there are three arbitrators, A, B & C, and they found
of testimony will be retained over any protracted period. Notes taken in multi-
session hearings are generally insufficient for that purpose. Moreover, consideration
should be given to also providing such copies to the parties at a nominal cost").
121. See id. at 148.
122. It is submitted that much of this information could alternatively be obtained
through the use of Award Reporting Services. For example, The New York Jury
Verdict Reporter publishes pertinent data about jury verdicts in the New York
courts. Indeed, in "a number of large cit[ies], claimants' attorneys have already
developed dossier information about arbitrators who sit with regularity." Lipton
Study, supra note 114, at 16-17. See also SROs Nearing Agreement on Using
Summary Arbitration Award, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 795 (May
27, 1982); J. Cahill, Investors Seek Court of Last Resort, N.Y. Daily News, June
5, 1988, (Business), at 13, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 5, 1988, § 3 (Business), at
12, col. 3. SICA, at the instance of the SEC, is considering a mandatory one-
page award statement prepared by the arbitrators which would disclose: (1) the
name of the arbitration case; (2) a one-paragraph summary of the dispute; (3)
damages or other relief requested; (4) damages or other relief awarded; (5) a
summary of the issues involved and resolved; and, (6) the names of the arbitrators.
Id. Since such award statement is to be prepared by the arbitrators, and in a
complex case could well exceed the one-page format, this procedure could result
in de facto written opinions. Such opinions have their advantages, but must be
measured in terms of the overall effect on and cost of arbitration. See infra notes
123-25 and accompanying text.
123. Although it would appear that the majority of public arbitrators in the
SRO pools are attorneys, the overwhelming number of industry arbitrators are not.
See Lipton Study, supra note 114, at 17.
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damages of $10,000, $20,000 and $30,000, respectively. Suppose they
ultimately agree on a $20,000 award. When they write the opinion,
however, A bases his award on unsuitability, B on churning and C
on unauthorized trading. Can A, B and C issue an award for $20,000,
even though they cannot agree on the reasons? Moreover, would
they?
Nor would written opinions necessarily enhance the cause of fair-
ness. Indeed, in some instances mandatory opinions might even result
in fewer awards in favor of claimants on general equity grounds.'1
It would also put additional pressure on the already strained staffs
of the administering forum, while drafts of written opinions would
be circulated and recirculated among the various arbitrators for
corrections, redrafts and finalization.
Furthermore, arbitrators would have to be compensated for the
additional time required to render such opinions. Indeed, it is re-
spectfully submitted that instead of being used as the window into
the rationale of arbitrators, a written opinion will be used as a
platform and blueprint for many more appeals, because it identifies
targets, meaningful or otherwise, for the losing party to attack.
Appeals are both costly and time consuming. 125
Thus, looking at the totality of it, requiring written opinions of
fact and law by arbitration panels-many of whom are not lawyers-
would add delay and cost to arbitration without greatly enhancing
or improving its operations. On the other hand, awards should clearly
state the result, e.g., if it includes relief for punitive damages or a
RICO claim, it should state this separately.
E. Independence of Forum
Even if we could all agree that we could forge rules of arbitration
that are fair, and even if we could oversee and ensure that their
implementation was fair, we are still faced with the nagging complaint
that we may be "compelling an investor to arbitrate securities claims
... in a forum controlled by the securities industry. ' ' 126 In other
124. Often, even though no specific violation occurred, arbitrators will render
an award in favor of the claimant on general equity considerations. It is respectfully
suggested that if such awards had to be reduced to writing, many of those so
called equity awards would evaporate.
125. Appeals were considered by SICA and rejected as too costly and time
consuming. See Katsoris II, supra note 45, at 290-91.
126. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2355 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The uniform opposition of investors to compel arbitration
and the overwhelming support of the securities industry for the process suggests
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words, how can you convince the public that they are not facing a
"stacked deck"? 27
In over fifteen years of sitting as a public arbitrator, it has been
this author's experience that the securities arbitration procedures have,
to date, resulted in an overall good faith effort to provide fair
resolution of public securities disputes. Nevertheless, the image of a
"stacked deck" will never be totally eliminated merely by improving
the rules or the arbitrators. "[J]ustice should not only be done, but
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."'' 28 The only
permanent solution to any lingering allegation is to remove securities
arbitrations from the SROs themselves to a totally independent forum, 29
jointly governed by members of the public 3 ° and the securities in-
dustry. 3' Such a concept was considered by SICA before McMahon.13 2
Indeed, the public members of SICA continue to express the opinion
that such a separate forum should be established.'33 Moreover, it is
submitted that such separate forum remain under the oversight au-
thority of the SEC.3 4
A separate independent forum means just that-independent from
actual, inferential, subtle, practical or any other kind of imaginable
that there must be some truth to the investors' belief that the securities industry
has an advantage in a forum under its own control. See Glaberson, When The
Investor Has A Gripe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § 3 (Business), at 8, col. 1
("[tihe houses basically like the present system because they own the stacked deck")
[hereinafter Glaberson].
127. Glaberson, supra note 126, at 8, col. 1.
128. Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d
899, 903, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28 (1976) (quoting King v. Sussex Justices, (1924) 1
K.B. 256, 259).
129. An analogous concept has proved workable in the accounting field. In fact,
since 1977, some of the trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF)
have been selected by electors outside the accounting profession. See FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATus REPORT No. 68, at 2 (June 21, 1978).
The FAF appoints, oversees and finances the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB), which is responsible for formulating the rules by which companies account
and report their financial condition. Id. at 1-2; see HORNGREN, INTRODUCTION TO
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 57-58 (2d ed. 1984).
130. The litmus test for such public member should be as stringent as that for
a public arbitrator. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
131. These public and industry representatives should have total responsibility
for the appointment of arbitrators and the governance of the arbitration forums.
Indeed, the SEC has expressed its concern regarding possible public apprehension
over the impartiality of officials associated with SROs. See Investor Dispute System,
supra note 12, 81,136, at 87,906.
132. See SCHROPP, supra note 54, at 172.
133. See id.
134. Such oversight authority by the SEC over the new forum might require
congressional approval.
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pressure. The forum should be independent of the industry, inde-
pendent of the plaintiffs' bar, and, to some extent, independent of
the SEC, other than in its general oversight role.'35 Its staff must
also be independent from such influences. It must be a system that
encourages career staff retention rather than staff turnover. Fur-
thermore, arbitrators must also be free from such influences or
pressures; otherwise, getting the necessary complement of competent
independent arbitrators to serve with regularity will be extremely
difficult, if not impossible to achieve.
It is doubtful whether an independent forum would increase the
overall cost of arbitration. In fact, in the long run, it might even
be more cost efficient than the aggregate costs of all of the various
SROs. In any event, even a rise in cost could easily be funded by
a small mandatory surcharge imposed upon each securities transaction.
Moreover, the cost is negligible in view of the alternatives-namely
mistrust of arbitration, endless debate and the ultimate flooding of
the courts with securities disputes.13 6
Ideally, such a new forum should provide for widely dispersed,
permanent hearing locations. 37 Arbitrator pools should be merged.'
Experienced staff personnel at the SROs could help restaff the in-
135. An independent forum will also help insulate an SRO from any potential
conflicts of interests that might arise from the fact that the SRO supplies the
arbitration forum. For example, does the arbitration department of an SRO have
any "duty" to reveal to the enforcement and disciplinary branch of the same SRO
any potential improprieties it discovers during the arbitration? Moreover, to what
extent is an SRO vulnerable to SEC inquiry concerning the details of a particular
arbitration proceeding specifically, or arbitration proceedings generally? In other
words, the arbitration process cannot be turned into an extension of those charged
with investigatory, enforcement or disciplinary responsibilities. This does not mean,
of course, that the parties themselves could not refer improprieties to such other
bodies. Indeed, SICA intends to add to its Procedures Booklet a statement that
investors involved in disputes with a broker-dealer may draw regulatory attention
to their allegations. See SCHROPP, supra note 54, at 163. Moreover, SICA intends
to include in the newly proposed Arbitrators Manual a statement advising the
arbitrators that they "may" refer a matter to the disciplinary authorities of an
SRO if they find that the conduct of a broker-dealer is "particularly egregious."
Id. (emphasis added).
136. See Katsoris II, supra note 45, at 312. Nor should the fact be ignored that
the industry saves significant operating expenses by handling customer disputes
through arbitration rather than court litigation.
137. While both the NYSE and NASD conduct arbitration hearings virtually
around the country, their administration activities are more centrally located in
New York. The NASD also has offices in Chicago and San Francisco. See Lipton
Study, supra note 114, at 5.
138. Most SROs presently keep their own lists of arbitrators. See PROCEDURES
BOOKLET, supra note 18, at 3.
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dependent forum. The important thing is that the forum be governed
by an independent management. It is only such structurally inde-
pendent governance that should forever still any inferences of a
"stacked deck.' 1 39
Whether as a practical matter a separate independent forum will
ever fly, only time will tell; but, it should be examined thoroughly.
In the meantime, there should be some consolidation among the SRO
arbitration forums. The SROs should immediately address this issue
of perception by placing a meaningful number of public members
on their arbitration committees that "oversee" their arbitration fo-
rums. Moreover, their budgets should be enlarged to meet the ex-
panding needs of arbitration due to the anticipated increase in the
numbers and complexity of cases as a result of the McMahon decision.
The system will be tested in the years ahead, and it must be prepared
to cope with it, if arbitration, as we know it, is to survive; and,
survive it must in order to offer securities litigants a viable alternative
to courtroom congestion and delay.
VI. Conclusion
After the events of October 19, 1987,140 many individual investors-
so essential to the health of our securities markets14 1-have lost faith
in the markets. 42 Rebuilding that faith will take time and much
effort. Essential to the rebuilding of such confidence is the assurance
that if a customer has a justifiable grievance against his broker, the
controversy will be resolved fairly, yet swiftly, cheaply and with
finality. 1 3 The only mechanism that can provide that relief is ar-
139. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
140. See Shell, Arbitration After the Crash, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 21, 1988, at 13,
col. 1.
141. See Katsoris, In Defense of Capital Gains, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1973).
142. "Forty percent of small investors have left the market since Oct. 19 ...
[aind it is becoming clear that the individual investors will not return to the market
if they do not perceive that they are treated fairly." Nash, supra note 60, at A20,
col. 1; Wallace, The Death of Investor Confidence, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1988,§ 3 (Business), at 1, col. 3; Gottschalk, Gloom Pervades Investment Conferences
As Talk Turns to Crashes and Tulip Bulbs, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1988, at 35,
col. 4.
143. See Statement of Constantine N. Katsoris before the Securities & Exchange
Commission (Dec. 8, 1977) ("[tlo insure . . .public investment we must retain the
public's confidence-confidence in the markets themselves and confidence that should
a dispute arise, it will be fairly resolved. This confidence, however, can only be
earned by maintaining a de facto as well as a de jure image of fairness. In other
words, the procedural rules must be fair and the administration of the forum must
be objective and independent; [moreover] such administration should include public
representation") (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
SECURITIES ARBITRATION
bitration. Certainly dumping thousands of cases back to the courts
is not the answer.144
The McMahon decision gives arbitration the opportunity to make
necessary adjustments that will insure that it will be freely chosen
as the principal means of settling securities disputes. The opportunity,
however, must not be wasted by populist, expedient or short term
approaches which would strip arbitration of its chief attributes-
speed and economy. Arbitration can be fair and still not made a
clone of court litigation and procedures.
The McMahon momentum must be used to forge a forum that
is equally fair to both claimants and respondents. If we fail, neither
side will be the winner. The industry will be plagued by excessive
litigation costs that, directly or indirectly, will be borne by the public;
and, the public will often be denied justice by the costs and delays
of court litigation.
To achieve this goal of an arbitration procedure that is practical
and fair for all, many of the procedural and mechanical changes
suggested above will have to be considered-with some being adopted
and some rejected. In this regard, reasonable people can differ. SICA,
with all its shortcomings, 45 has been a constructive voice in this
dialogue and should continue to independently discuss, amend and
monitor the Uniform Code of Arbitration.
Finally, a separate and independent forum should be established
to handle securities disputes under the general regulatory authority
of the SEC. It is only by establishing such independence that the
whispers of "favoritism" will be stilled, once and for all.
144. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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